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HOPELESS CASES: IN DEFENCE OF 
COMPENSATING LITIGANTS AT THE 
ADVOCATE'S EXPENSE 
Duncan Webb * 
The dividing line between novel litigation and cases which are an abuse of process and a waste 
of time can be a difficult one to draw.  Some would argue that the tension between these two 
public policies is reason enough not to award costs against an advocate bringing or defending 
"hopeless" causes.  The author, however, is of the view that the jurisdiction to award such costs is 
justified in the interests of protecting clients and maintaining professional standards.  An 
analysis of the case law reveals that the power is used sparingly and, if there is any doubt, the 
court will favour the advocate. 
I INTRODUCTION 
There are numerous reasons why a litigant may wish to bring a case or mount a 
defence which has no prospect of success. 1 Few would disagree that the bringing of such 
cases should be discouraged. One way in which the courts have sought to discourage 
such cases is by compensating the successful litigant, and punishing the advocate 2 for the 
unsuccessful side by awarding costs against the advocate for assisting in bringing the 
hopeless case or defence. Such awards are made on the ground that the court has an 
inherent jurisdiction to ensure that its procedure is not abused and used to achieve an 
injustice to one of the parties, and to punish misconduct of those who appear before it. 3 
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington. Thanks are due to the Centre 
for Legal Practice at the University of Exeter where this paper was completed while on research 
leave. 
1 Motivations such as spite, a collateral advantage in related negotiations or litigation, or an 
unfounded belief that there is merit in the claim all come to mind. 
2 This term will be used to denote any legal adviser who acts for a client in litigation, whether as a 
barrister or solicitor or both. 
3 Assisting in the bringing of a hopeless case will in some cases be in breach of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct of Barristers and Solicitors. Rule 7.04 provides that:
296 (1999) 30 VUWLR 
In most cases costs orders made by the courts will only partially compensate for the 
financial hardship of the trial, and can never compensate for the associated stress. How 
much greater then is the wrong done to the successful litigant when the opposing claim 
or defence is wholly without foundation. 4 When a case is demonstrably hopeless the 
successful party has been put to the considerable cost and trouble of a trial for no cause 
whatsoever. This is one motivation for the longstanding attitude of the law in 
discouraging the bringing of hopeless cases. 5 
This paper seeks to the possible tensions that such a rule creates within the role of an 
advocate, and examine the basis on which the intervention of the court has been justified. 
By examining in greater detail the limited circumstances in which the courts have 
exercised the jurisdiction to order costs against an advocate it will be seen that the 
objections to the jurisdiction are not persuasive. Thus, my thesis is that a rule which 
compensates litigants who have been brought before the court to defend a hopeless cause 
(or dismiss a hopeless defence) by ordering the advocate to pay the costs (and thereby 
punishing the advocate) is justified. 
II CONFLICTING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The rule by which an advocate may be personally liable for loss suffered by their 
client's opponent has been objected to on a number of policy grounds. It is claimed that 
there is danger that an advocate's zeal may be cooled by the prospect of an adverse order 
of costs. Perhaps of more concern is the suggestion that deserving cases will go 
unlitigated, or possible defences not raised, because of the reluctance of advocates to 
press novel causes. In the leading English, Ridehalgh v Horsefield, the clear tension 
between the competing policy interests was recognised when Sir Thomas Bingham MR 
noted that there is: 6 
A practitioner must make all reasonable efforts to ensure that legal processes are used for their 
proper purposes only and that their use is not likely to cause unnecessary embarrassment, 
distress or inconvenience to another person's reputation, interests or occupation. 
4 The issue addressed by this paper is the same whether the advocate is assisting with a hopeless 
case or hopeless defence. The principles applicable to the question of whether either will amount 
to an abuse of the process of the court are the same, see Chua v ANZ (1997) 11 PRNZ 523 (HC). For 
the sake of clarity and brevity this paper has been written from the perspective of the prosecution 
of a hopeless case. 
5 The problem is an ancient one: Laws 1, 3 & 4 of Hammurabi provided that where unsubstantiated 
claims were brought the wrongful claimant was liable for the defendant for the sanction claimed 
(even death), see Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor (2 ed, Society of Biblical 
Literature, Atlanta, 1997).  Justinian's Institutes provide at Book IV Title XVI that an advocate must 
swear an oath as the belief of the veracity of the claim or defence. 
6 [1994] Ch 205, 206 (CA).
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a tension between two important public interests. One is that lawyers should not be deterred 
from pursuing their clients' interests by fear of incurring personal liability to their clients' 
opponents; that they should not be penalised by orders to pay costs without a fair opportunity 
to defend themselves; that wasted costs orders should not become a back­door means of 
recovering costs not otherwise recoverable against a legally aided or impoverished litigant; and 
that the remedy should not grow unchecked to become more damaging than the disease. The 
other public interest… is that litigants should not be financially prejudiced by the unjustifiable 
conduct of litigation by their [opponents or their] lawyers. 
The prospect of being punished for bringing a hopeless case in many ways highlights 
the difficulties facing the advocate. The tension between the advocate's overriding duty of 
frankness to the court and the duty of loyalty to the client is exacerbated by the 
prohibition on bringing or defending hopeless causes. The prohibition prevents the 
advocate from bringing an argument to the court's attention for consideration where it is 
wholly without merit. For an advocate to act as a pre­trial screen of doomed claims or 
defences places them in a position of considerable conflict by making them a preliminary 
judge of the issue. The duty not to take hopeless cases must also be reconciled with the 
duty to act for any client (the "cab rank rule") regardless of the advocate's attitude to their 
cause. It should also be noted that such a prohibition would seem to encourage a certain 
scepticism of client claims, and lack of creativity in legal argument that might not be in 
the best interests of the administration of justice in the long run. Moreover to require an 
advocate to act as such a screen requires a great deal from an advocate who may have 
enough trouble being retained on doubtful briefs, without requiring the advocate to wait 
for a retainer with better prospects for success. Perhaps most problematic is the fact that 
because it is open to any litigant to apply for costs against the advocate of the other side 
the advocate may therefore conduct the case not only in the interests of the client, and the 
court, but also with an eye to ensuring that no injustice is done to the other side in 
pursing a claim or defence. 
For the advocate these are all compelling reasons to resist the court's assumption of a 
power to award costs against them. However, such reasoning smacks of protectionism 
from the perspective of the frustrated litigant who has been dragged through a protracted 
and costly court case in which their opponent never had any prospect of success. While 
the court should ensure that such sanctions are not imposed lightly, the costs that a 
litigant are needlessly put to ought to be borne by the wrongdoer(s) who caused them. 
While such an order does act to compensate the wronged litigant, an equally 
interested party is the court itself. The court is concerned to ensure that it is not used as 
an instrument to perpetuate injustice, rather than achieve justice by the abuses of those 
who appear before it. The power to award costs against advocates who bring hopeless
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cases ensures that the court has the power to protect its own procedure against abuse, 
and control the conduct of the advocates who exercise the privilege of audience. 
III JUSTIFICATION OF THE COURT'S SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION 
Courts exist as tribunals to which citizens may turn when they find themselves at an 
impasse in a dispute. The task of the court is to do justice between the parties according 
to the law. Unfortunately the process of the court also lends itself to other uses; delaying 
inevitable liabilities by mounting hopeless defences, making exaggerated allegations in 
the hope of a windfall payment, and employment as a platform on which to air 
grievances for which no legal remedy exists. Such tactics are abuses of the procedure of 
the court. 
If the objectives of the court are to be achieved, rather than thwarted by such abuses, it 
is necessary for the court to be able to act immediately against the perpetrators of the 
abuse. One such perpetrator is the advocate who is central to the bringing of such a case. 
Moreover, it is the advocate's duty to advise a litigant as to the rules applicable to 
bringing a matter before the court and to ensure, as far as possible, that such rules are 
complied with. Culpability for bringing a hopeless case before the courts therefore lies 
with the advocate as much or more than with the litigant. 
The ability of the court to sanction advocates by awarding costs against them acts as 
an important signal to the profession as to what standards of conduct are acceptable, and 
a considerable financial deterrent against breaching those standards. Such a disincentive 
is particularly necessary in light of the considerable pressures, from the client or from the 
financial pressures of legal practice, to take a case. Such a sanction ensures that the courts 
are equipped to be instruments of justice rather than injustice. Without an effective 
weapon to prevent advocates assisting in abuses of the court's process, the court would 
be open to be used as a tool of injustice and oppression. 
At a more specific level it is important to ensure that any litigant who comes to court 
ought not have unnecessary costs imposed. Individuals who come (or are brought before) 
the court have a right to expect that the court will ensure that the process and outcome 
will not result in unfairness. Where a litigant is the victim of an abuse of process the 
opposing advocate is directly responsible. Although the proceeding is formally initiated 
by the other litigant, it is in practice drafted and filed by the advocate without whom the 
proceeding would never be brought. Where an action is inappropriately brought, or an 
illusory defence raised with the assistance of an advocate, the wronged litigant should be 
compensated for the expense to which they have been put in dismissing the abusive 
proceeding. If all other things were equal there would be a strong argument that the cost 
of such compensation should, at least in part, be borne by the wrongful litigant. However
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there are a number of reasons why, in some cases, the cost of compensating the wronged 
litigant should be borne by the advocate. 
First, if compensation were payable by the litigant, in a number of cases such an order 
would be worthless due to the inability of the litigant to pay. Where there is more than 
one wrongdoer (ie litigant and advocate) it is inappropriate that the wronged party run 
the risk of the litigant being unable to meet an order for compensation. Secondly, in terms 
of apportioning blame the advocate is in many ways more blameworthy than the litigant. 
The litigant bringing the groundless action or defence is not an expert in the law, or in 
assessing evidence and in determining whether it will form a basis for a claim or defence. 
This is the task of the advocate. Moreover the advocate should be familiar with the rules 
of the court, and the ethical and professional duties owed to the administration of justice 
which override the duty of loyalty to the client. Thirdly, the advocate is an officer of the 
court and therefore assisting in bringing a hopeless claim or defence is perverting the 
ends of a tribunal of which he or she is a quasi member. 
The courts have always assumed the power to govern the conduct of those who 
appear before them. This is particularly apposite in respect of advocates who are officers 
of the court. 7 Where the court regulates the conduct of an advocate appearing before it, it 
is not only regulating its own procedure, it is also disciplining its officers. Where a 
hopeless case is brought with the assistance of the advocate, the advocate must either be 
bringing it in the knowledge that it is hopeless (and therefore assisting in an abuse), or 
believing that it is not hopeless (and therefore incompetent) or not caring whether it is 
hopeless (and therefore guilty of recklessness or gross negligence). In any of these cases 
the conduct of the advocate warrants action being taken by the court. 
While in recent cases the courts have downplayed the disciplinary aspect of such 
orders, preferring to focus on the compensatory justification, 8 it is still a method by 
which the courts are summarily disciplining advocates. Such discipline is both justifiable 
and necessary. Were such breaches of the duty to the administration of justice to go 
unsanctioned the court would be abdicating its responsibility to govern what goes on in 
its precincts. 
7 In New Zealand both barristers and solicitors are officers of the court. The position is somewhat 
different in England where solicitors have historically been governed by the courts, and the courts 
have the power to discipline and strike names from the roll. Barristers, however, are governed by 
the various Inns of Court. The judges of the courts act as the final disciplinary authority as visitors 
to the Inns. This supervisory jurisdiction is also apparent in the court's power to enforce 
practitioners' undertakings. See Re Grey [1892] 2 QB 440, 443 (CA), per Lord Esher MR, Gill and 
McAsey v Wainui Timber Co Ltd [1992] 1 NZLR 1, 4 (CA) per Richardson J. 
8 See Part VI of this article.
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Although misconduct in the conduct of litigation by an advocate falls within the 
disciplinary jurisdiction of the Law Society, it is still necessary for the court to act against 
such advocates within the course of the offending proceeding. In some cases of 
professional misconduct the court may also see fit to refer the matter to the District Law 
Society to take further action. 9 While the two jurisdictions are obviously related, they are 
quite distinct and both remain important. The focus of the court's jurisdiction is the 
efficacy of its own proceeding. To ensure this it needs to have the ability to intervene in 
the proceeding itself rather than to defer to a separate and later disciplinary hearing of 
the professional body. 
To rely on the disciplinary function of the professional body would have a number of 
potential shortcomings. Most importantly for the complaining litigant it would mean an 
additional proceeding to redress the injustice of the bringing of the groundless claim. 
Moreover the disciplinary proceedings of the District Law Societies are exactly that ­ 
disciplinary. They are focused on the conduct of their members and punishing any 
incident of misconduct. While there is an ability to award compensation to an injured 
party, this is not the purpose of the proceeding and such a proceeding is an inappropriate 
action for a wronged litigant to seek compensation for having to defend a hopeless case. 10 
The complainant is not a party to proceedings before a disciplinary tribunal and the 
proceeding is conducted in a manner more akin to a court of inquiry than a civil 
proceeding. 11 While it may be justifiable for matters of discipline to be considered by a 
professional tribunal comprised of an advocate's peers, it is not appropriate that a litigant 
be required to rely on such a tribunal for compensation for wrongs committed by an 
advocate in the course of proceedings. 
The jurisdiction to award costs against advocates is justified because it is an effective 
measure to reduce the incidences of hopeless claims and defences being brought before 
the court. While the court will always be wary of denying a litigant access to the courts 
(as the cases discussed in this article demonstrate) where a case is meritless, and this is 
apparent to any competent advocate, it ought not to be brought before the court. Holding 
9 This course was adopted by Hammond J in Chua v ANZ above n 4, 529. Similarly in McDonald v 
FAI (NZ) General Insurance Co Ltd [1999] 1 NZLR 583 (HC) [ McDonald v FAI], CP 507/95 the matter 
was referred to the District Law Society by Giles J for revision of the offending advocate's bill of 
costs to her client. [Editor's note: this article was submitted before the Court of Appeal heard the 
appeal from Giles J's decision.] 
10 Law Practitioners Act 1982, ss 106(4)(e) and 112(2)(f). Section 106(4)(e) limits the amount that may 
be paid in compensation to any person who has suffered loss. 
11 Provision is made for the representation of both the practitioner and the Society, but no reference 
is made to the complainant: Law Practitioners Act 1982, ss 124 and 125.
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responsible the advocate who has brought the case despite its having no prospect of 
success will act as a more effective deterrent than other measures that might be proposed. 
Holding the litigant liable to compensate the other party where a groundless claim or 
defence is brought is unlikely to be effective. Where the client is insolvent and raises a 
hopeless defence in an effort to stave off the inevitable, a threat of an award of full costs 
will be irrelevant. Where the litigant is bringing a baseless claim for a collateral purpose 
the threat of costs will frequently be minimal in comparison to the collateral advantage 
which is sought. Accordingly such costs orders will be an ineffective disincentive. 
It is also inappropriate to leave the wronged litigant to seek redress in another forum, 
be it a professional tribunal, or a further claim in court. It would run counter to the spirit 
and purpose of the rule prohibiting advocates from assisting in bringing hopeless cases if 
it were enforced by further satellite litigation, based on a wrongful claim which ought 
never have been brought. 
It is a principle of common sense as well as justice that, where a wrong has been 
suffered, a remedy ought to lie against the perpetrator. It is inappropriate for a 
wrongdoer to shield behind a protectionist immunity. Although advocates have long 
enjoyed an immunity from claims against them in respect of negligence in the conduct of 
litigation, 12 that immunity has recently been viewed with some scepticism by the courts 
and restricted to what is considered to be absolutely necessary to effect the policy of the 
unfettered administration of justice. 13 The suggestion that the imposition of costs orders 
against counsel for misconduct or incompetence fetters the proper administration of 
justice to a degree that warrants the wronged litigant bearing the resulting costs is 
unsustainable and has been rejected by the legislature in England, 14 and the courts in 
New Zealand. 15 The words of the Sir Thomas Bingham MR in Ridehalgh v Horsefield 
express the weakness of any argument which advocates the extension of barristerial 
immunity to cover costs claims: 16 
It is one thing to say that an advocate shall be immune from claims in negligence by an 
aggrieved and unsuccessful client. It is quite another for the court to take steps to rectify, at the 
12 Rondel v Worsley [1967] 1 QB 443 (CA). 
13 Saif Ali v Sidney Mitchell & Co [1980] AC 198, 229 (HL) per Lord Salmon, Biggar v McLeod [1978] 2 
NZLR 9, 11 (CA). A detailed argument for the abolition of such an immunity can be found in 
Sandra Segal "It is Time to End the Lawyer's Immunity from Countersuit" (1987) 35 UCLA L Rev 
99. 
14 By s 51 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK). 
15 McDonald v FAI above n 9. 
16 Above n 6, 236.
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expense of the advocate, breaches by the advocate of the duty he owed to the court to further 
the ends of justice. 
While the current law protects advocates against claims for negligence in the conduct 
of litigation, where the wrong committed is intentional, due to gross incompetence, or 
negligence, the policy arguments for immunity wither. It must be remembered that for 
every claim barred by the immunity rule there is a claimant who goes without redress. 
The privilege of contributing to the unfettered administration of justice is small 
consolation where the advocate's actions have caused considerable financial loss. 
Therefore where the advocate causes loss which was easily preventable (that is the loss 
not due to mere negligence) the advocate should be held liable to compensate those who 
suffered that loss. 
The inherent power of the court to discipline an advocate for assisting in the 
prosecution of a hopeless case or mounting a hopeless defence is not an isolated power. It 
exists as part of the overall jurisdiction of the court to ensure that its officers act at all 
times properly, and that its procedures are not abused. The court will summarily 
discipline advocates wherever misconduct is apparent. Examples are where a retainer 
places the confidential information of a former client at risk, where an advocate refuses to 
honour an undertaking, and where reckless or unfounded allegation are made from the 
bar. 17 
Such a jurisdiction assists in the speedy and efficient delivery of justice, and demands 
the highest standards of conduct from advocates. Where the actions of its officers are in 
error, the court will move swiftly to rectify the situation. It is important that this power 
exists in respect of all instances of misconduct. To do otherwise would be to introduce an 
asymmetry into the supervisory jurisdiction of the court which would be without 
foundation. 
IV THE INHERENT JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The existence of the power to prevent its process being used for a collateral purpose 
or as an instrument of injustice has long been recognised. 18 This is part of the inherent 
jurisdiction of the court. The power is one that is derived "from the very nature of the 
17 Black v Taylor [1993] 3 NZLR 403 (CA), Re McDougall's Application [1982] 1 NZLR 141, 142 (HC), 
Gazley v Wellington District Law Society [1996] 1 NZLR 452, 454. 
18 Metropolitan Bank v Pooley (1885) 10 App cas 210, 220 (HL). The power has similarly long been 
recognised in respect of the power to stay frivolous or vexatious proceedings: McHenry v Lewis 
(1882) 21 ChD 202 (HC). Most recently see Ebert v Birch, The Times, April 28 1999, 34 (CA).
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court as a superior court of law" 19 to ensure that they are indeed instruments of justice 
rather than oppression. Thus, as long ago as, 1885 Lord Blackburn stated that from early 
times: 20 
[T]he court had inherently the right to see that its process was not abused by a proceeding 
without reasonable grounds, so as to be vexatious and harassing – the court had the right to 
protect itself against such abuse. 
These powers to protect against abuse, and the related duty to supervise its own 
officers, are the foundation for the court's power to use an award of costs to effect 
discipline, compensation and deterrence. 
The court will always exercise its jurisdiction to ensure that the ends of justice are not 
thwarted by those who use its procedure for improper ends. This policy was stated in 
Hunter v Chief Constable for the Western Midlands by Lord Diplock when observing that the 
case concerned: 21 
The inherent power which any court of justice must possess to prevent misuse of its procedure 
in a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of its procedural rules, 
would nevertheless be manifestly unfair to a party to litigation before it, or would otherwise 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right­thinking people. 
In New Zealand the inherent power to order costs against advocates is not expressly 
referred to in any of the legislation or governing rules of the court. 22 Other jurisdictions 
have chosen to extend or clarify the inherent powers of the court by articulation in 
legislative instruments. Thus, in England section 51 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 
empowers a court to order a party's legal representative (including a barrister) to pay any 
19 J Jacob "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court" [1970] CLP 23, reprinted in J Jacob The Reform of 
Civil Procedural Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1982) 224. New Zealand Social Credit Political League 
v O'Brien [1984] 1 NZLR 84 (CA) is the leading New Zealand authority. 
20 Metropolitan Bank v Pooley above n 18, 220. 
21 [1982] AC 529, 536 (HL), applied in Christensen v Peat Marwick [1994] 3 NZLR 745 (HC). It is of note 
that some commentators have referred to the power as one of a "superior court" (see Jacob, above n 
19).  However, the current view is that any court has the power to prevent an abuse of its own 
procedure by making orders against advocates. 
22 Rule 46 of the New Zealand High Court Rules gives the court a broad discretion in respect of the 
award costs which have been construed as allowing costs orders against advocates: Y v M [1994] 3 
NZLR 581 (HC). Section 16 of the Judicature Act 1908 preserves the inherent jurisdiction of the 
High Court that it had prior to the passing of the Act. The jurisdiction has been applied in respect 
of costs against advocates: Stephens v Stephens [1991] 1 NZLR 633 (HC), Utah Construction and 
Mining Co v Watson [1969] NZLR 1062 (CA).
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costs which are wasted through that representative's improper, unreasonable or negligent 
conduct (frequently called "wasted costs orders"). 23 
The English provisions and the cases decided under them are relevant to the New 
Zealand context. The approach of the English Court of Appeal in the leading English case 
of the provisions of Ridehalgh v Horsefield 24 has been adopted by the High Court of New 
Zealand in McDonald v FAI. 25 Ridehalgh discusses the provisions in terms of a 
compensatory principle which is of direct relevance in the New Zealand situation. 
The United States position is typified by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (which is reflected in many States). 26 That rule provides that an attorney in 
making any representation to the court warrants that the action is not improper, that the 
arguments of law are made in good faith, and the factual allegations and denials have a 
credible basis. 27 In the event that the rule is breached the court has wide disciplinary 
powers. 28 
23 The relevant part of s 51 provides: 
(6) In any proceedings mentioned in subsection (1), the court may disallow, or (as the case 
may be) order the legal or other representative concerned to meet, the whole of any 
wasted costs or such part of them as may be determined in accordance with rules of 
court. 
(a) as a result of any improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission on the 
part of any legal or other representative or any employee of such a 
representative; or 
(b) which, in the light of any such act or omission occurring after they were 
incurred, the court considers it is unreasonable to expect that party to pay. 
Similar provisions in respect of the conduct of criminal cases can be found in the Prosecution of 
Offences Act 1985, s 19A. The jurisdiction is expounded in J Holland (ed) Cordery on Solicitors (9 ed, 
Butterworths, London, 1996) particularly Section 10. See also Steven Fennel "Wasted Costs after 
the Courts and Legal Services Act " [1993] Professional Negligence 25. 
24 Ridehalgh v Horsefield above n 6. 
25 McDonald v FAI above n 9, 592. 
26 For a good analysis of the rule and its policies, see Michael Mazurczak "Critical Analysis of Rule 
11 Sanctions in the Seventh Circuit" (1988) 72 Marquette L Rev 91. 
27 In particular r 11(b) provides: 
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a 
pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying 
that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances, 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
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While the older cases refer to orders of costs against solicitors who are traditionally 
answerable to the court, courts have recently awarded costs against counsel as well as 
solicitors. This approach is particularly appropriate in New Zealand in light of the fact 
that practitioners are free to act as solicitors and/or barristers, and there is no 
independent governance of practitioners who act as barristers. There appears little 
justification for exempting barristers from the disciplinary powers of the court when the 
wrongs committed are no different in kind or degree from those of solicitors which have 
always incurred the sanctions of the court. 
V COSTS AGAINST ADVOCATES GENERALLY 
The situations in which the court will make an order of costs against an advocate vary 
and are not closed. While misconduct often exists, and in many cases the conduct of the 
advocate is reprehensible, this need not be the case. Where there is an error that shows a 
lack of competence (not just a lack of judgement) or negligence in a failure to attend to 
routine matters the court may make an order. 
Some cases are clear. In Kamo Sports & Dive Ltd v Harrison Sports (Kamo) Ltd 29 counsel 
for the plaintiffs sought to introduce new expert evidence at the trial when timetable 
orders which had allowed for the exchange of briefs of evidence had not been complied 
with. The default was solely the fault of counsel. In ordering costs Fisher J stated that "the 
time has come for the Courts to blow the whistle on non­observance of pretrial 
directions" 30 and ordered counsel to pay the increase in the costs of the defendant which 
had been caused by the non­compliance. Similarly, inexcusable delay in taking steps 
(2) the claims, defences, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law 
or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
law or the establishment of new law; 
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so 
identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. 
28 Rule 11(c)(2) provides: 
the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a non­monetary nature, an order to 
pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective 
deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable 
attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation. 
29 (1993) 7 PRNZ 321 (HC). 
30 Kamo Sports & Dive Ltd v Harrison Sports (Kamo) Ltd above n 29, 324.
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which puts the other side to expense will be sufficient reason for such an order. 31 
However the older test of gross negligence or serious dereliction of duty 32 has been 
discarded in favour of an approach which is more focussed on the unfairness of the other 
party bearing the costs which have been needlessly incurred. 33 
Where the failure in the conduct of the litigation cannot be laid at the door of the 
client it is inappropriate to tax the client with costs and the court will order costs against 
the advocate. Thus if a case is commenced without the actual authority of the litigant 
(through error or otherwise) the courts have ordered that costs be paid by the legal 
representative. 34 Where the case is in reality brought by the legal representative and in 
substance amounts to champerty (where the named party is a mere puppet), the legal 
representative will be similarly liable for costs. 35 
In cases where there has been serious misconduct by the advocate in the conduct of 
the hearing the court will use an order of costs to indicate the unacceptability of such 
conduct. In such cases the misconduct is often linked with hopeless defences or doomed 
claims. Chua v ANZ 36 is a case where the advocate sought to frustrate a mortgagee sale by 
raising unfounded defences. In the course of making an application for an ex parte 
injunction he knowingly misled the court. In the words of Hammond J: 37 
This appears to me to be a case in which Mr Middleton has put his zeal for his clients' interests 
ahead of his plain duty of candour to the court. On the evidence before me I have to say that he 
actively misled the court on 24 October. 
This resulted in an order of costs against counsel (but not the instructing solicitors). 
The court will also award costs where the advocate has failed to take reasonable 
measures to ensure that the litigant has adequately complied with orders of the court (for 
example in respect of interrogatories and discovery). The court will ensure that the costs 
incurred by such a failure are borne by the legal adviser. Thus in the leading case of 
31 Sinclair­Jones v Kay [1989] 1 WLR 114 (CA) where a delay in applying to set aside a default 
judgment of liability meant that the plaintiff needlessly prepared submissions as to quantum. 
32 Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282 (HL). 
33 Kamo Sports & Dive Ltd v Harrison Sports, above n 29, 324. 
34 Newbiggin­by­the­sea v Armstrong (1879) 13 ChD 310 (CA). 
35 In re Jones (1870) 6 Ch App Cas 497, 499 (CA). 
36 (1997) 11 PRNZ 523 (HC). 
37 Above n 36, 529. It is of note that Hammond J also took the step of drawing the conduct of counsel 
in this case to the attention of the District Law Society.
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Myers v Elman 38 the defendant's solicitors had failed to carefully advise the defendant of 
the scope of the discovery which was necessary. The court held that the extra costs 
incurred ought to be borne by the solicitor in question. Moreover, in that case although 
the affidavit in question was completed by a managing clerk of the office the solicitor was 
held responsible for the clerk's misconduct. 
If it becomes clear that there is no real likelihood of success of a claim or defence 
when new evidence comes to hand (for instance by discovery) the advocate may be 
obliged to amend the pleadings accordingly, or possibly to discontinue a claim. Thus in 
Edwards v Edwards 39 it was held by the court that the continued prosecution of a claim 
that a husband was wilfully neglecting his wife was unreasonably continued once the 
documents discovered by the husband made it clear that the claim was unsustainable. 
Sachs J stated that it was the duty of legal advisers to: 40 
examine closely whatever is disclosed on his opponent's affidavit of documents to see whether 
the relative prospects of success or failure have been altered thereby. 
The duty is not merely one to use good faith, or best endeavours. Rather the decision 
to proceed after discovery must be tested against the judgment of a reasonable adviser 
who investigated the facts with proper care. 41 This amounts to a duty not to pursue a 
hopeless case. 
VI THE COMPENSATORY JUSTIFICATION 
The theoretical basis of the power to award costs against advocates is the right of the 
court to govern its own procedures. However, the orders are motivated by a desire to 
ensure that litigants do not suffer loss by the misconduct of an opposing advocate. There 
are also hints in the cases that the judges also seek to set an example and to deter other 
advocates from misconducting themselves. 42 These three objectives of such orders, 
punitive, compensatory, and deterrent, are not necessarily inconsistent. While the 
inherent power of the court to govern its procedures seems to lend itself most readily to 
38 Above n 32. 
39 [1958] P 235. In this case the court also took note of the fact that the solicitors for the wife had 
needlessly required voluminous information which caused considerable wasted expenditure. 
40 Above n 39, 252­253. 
41 Above n 39, 255. 
42 See the "warning sounded" by Thomas J in Henricksen v Grierson Jackson Securities Pukekohe Ltd 
(1992) 2 NZ Conv Cas 191­419, 191­442 (HC), and Fisher J "blowing the whistle" on advocate 
failures in Kamo Sports & Dive Ltd v Harrison Sports (Kamo) Ltd above n 29.
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the punitive aspect of the jurisdiction, there has been a steady judicial and legislative 
trend to emphasise the compensatory justification. 
Prior to the overhaul of this area of the law in England, the courts had considerable 
difficulty justifying the jurisdiction without stating outright that the motive was 
compensatory. Even in the leading case of Myers v Elman 43 members of the House of 
Lords seemed to differ on the matter. Viscount Maugham stated that the primary object 
of the power was not to punish, but to protect the client, and indemnify the party who 
has suffered loss. 44 Lord Atkin framed the power as an adjunct of the duty of the 
advocate to conduct litigation with propriety, 45 while Lord Wright sought a balance by 
stating that the jurisdiction was not merely punitive but also compensatory. 46 
Subsequent courts have generally equivocated on the matter. 47 The English position 
has been resolved by the intervention of statute. 48 In McDonald v FAI 49 Giles J chose to 
adopt the philosophy behind the English approach. In emphasising the compensatory 
function of the jurisdiction he observed that the jurisdiction: 50 
...is necessary to ensure justice overall. It is available to the Court as a means of ensuring, in the 
appropriate case, that a litigant should not be financially prejudiced by unjustifiable conduct of 
litigation by counsel. 
It is, however, clear that for the jurisdiction to award costs to be invoked there must 
have been a serious lapse by the advocate which amounts to more than mere 
negligence. 51 Thus a disciplinary element remains. 
43 Above n 32. 
44 Above n 32, 282. 
45 Above n 32, 302. 
46 Above n 32, 319. 
47 See: Mauroux v Soc Com Abel Pereria Da Fonesca SARL [1972] 1 WLR 962, 970 (HC) ("primarily 
compensatory"); Currie & Co v The Law Society [1977] QB 990, 997 ("both punitive and 
compensatory"). These cases are reviewed in Davey Chiesman v Davey Chiesman [1984] Fam 48, 61 
(CA) per May LJ who took adopted the Currie & Co approach. 
48 Under the English statutory powers contained in s 51 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 it is clear that 
there is a compensatory motive behind such orders. See Re A Barrister (Wasted Costs Order) [1993] 
QB 293, 301 (CA), Ridehalgh v Horsefield above n 6, 227. 
49 Above n 9. The court adopted the approach in Ridehalgh v Horsefield (above n 6) in which a 
distinction was made between the compensatory wasted costs orders, and the disciplinary 
function of the courts. 
50 Above n 9, 591. 
51 Y v M above n 22.
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VII WHEN IS A CASE HOPELESS? 
The courts have been wary of stating outright that bringing a hopeless case amounts 
to misconduct in respect of which costs will be ordered against an advocate. This has led 
to an uneasy equivocation whereby it appears that the courts will intervene only when a 
hopeless case amounts to an abuse of process. Thus in Ridehalgh v Horsefield the English 
Court of Appeal took the view that bringing a hopeless case is not per se improper, 
unreasonable or negligent in terms of section 51 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. 52 The 
court relied on the observations of Lord Pearce in Rondel v Worsley: 53 
It is easier, pleasanter, and more advantageous professionally for barristers to advise, represent 
or defend those who are decent and reasonable and likely to succeed in their action or their 
defence than those who are unpleasant, unreasonable, disreputable and have an apparently 
hopeless case. Yet it would be tragic if our legal system came to provide no reputable 
defenders, representatives, or advisers for the latter. 
Those words were, however, spoken in defence of an advocate's immunity in respect 
of actions taken in the prosecution of litigation. They refer specifically to the policy basis 
behind the cab rank rule and its relationship with barristerial immunity from claims for 
negligence by lay clients. The statement does not refer to liability for costs for 
misconduct.  Moreover, Lord Pearce in Rondel identifies the need for advocates to take 
apparently hopeless cases. This suggests a case which might on first blush appear 
hopeless, but in fact has some prospect of success. 54 It is suggested that the claim in 
Ridehalgh v Horsefield that a litigant may reject an adviser's advice that a case is hopeless 
and insist that it be litigated is ill founded. 55 
Ridehalgh does, however, note that there are hopeless cases that will amount to an 
abuse of process. To assist in the prosecution of such a case would be misconduct which 
falls foul of the wasted costs rules. Sir Thomas Bingham MR acknowledged that the 
distinction between a legitimate hopeless case, and one which amounts to an abuse is 
difficult to define. It is, however, suggested that no such meaningful distinction can be 
52 Ridehalgh v Horsefield above n 6, 227. 
53 Above n 12, 275. 
54 There is a tendency in the cases and commentary to qualify the term "hopeless" with words such as 
"truly" or "absolutely". This can erroneously suggest that there are degrees of hopelessness. 
Hopeless is an absolute term. It is not possible for one case to be more hopeless than another. 
However, qualifiers such as "apparently" or "demonstrably" are meaningful as they refer to 
collateral matters such as whether a case superficially appears hopeless or can be shown to be 
hopeless. Accordingly I have attempted to avoid using terms such as "truly hopeless". 
55 Ridehalgh v Horsefield above n 6, 234.
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made. If a case is hopeless it is not motivated by a desire to obtain court awarded relief, 
and must therefore be motivated by some collateral purpose. The only exception to this 
would be where a case is pursued in the mistaken belief that it has some prospect of 
success when it is hopeless. Such an error suggests incompetence, itself sufficient reason 
to invoke the power of the court to award costs against the advocate. 
The power of a court to punish an advocate for assisting in the maintenance of a 
hopeless case presumes that such cases should be denied a court hearing. The exclusion 
of a claim from the courts is a serious step which runs counter to the stated object of the 
courts to make it as easy as possible for litigants to have access to them. It is important, 
then, that any rule excluding prospective litigants should be as clear as possible, and that 
in cases of doubt it should be presumed that the case is not hopeless. 
There are two ways in which a case might be considered hopeless: either the facts 
upon which the claim depends may be wholly unsustainable, or, while the facts pleaded 
may be provable, they may give rise to no recognised arguable action. Each of these kinds 
of hopelessness (and they are not exclusive) raise problems of their own. 
A Hopeless Facts 
The advocate is not a fact­finder. The primary task of an advocate in our judicial 
system is to present the client's case in the best light possible. They are not therefore to 
usurp the court's role in determining the credibility of witnesses, or the inferences which 
may be drawn from the evidence. This said, they are not allowed to assume the truth of 
their clients' evidence in an uncritical manner. One example of a case which, from the 
report, appears as much ridiculous as hopeless, but in which the advocate was not found 
to have acted improperly, is Orchard v South Eastern Electricity Board. 56 The plaintiffs in 
this case occupied a house which suffered from poltergeist­like phenomena. Patches of 
water would appear in areas of the house, especially around electricity sockets, and items 
of furniture would move. The plaintiffs claimed that these phenomena were due to an 
escape of electricity which caused water to vaporise and reappear as the patches of water. 
The escape similarly caused static build­ups which in turn caused the furniture to move. 
Perhaps most surprising is the fact that these allegations were supported by the evidence 
of an independent expert. It transpired that the phenomena were the result of actions by 
the plaintiffs' 15 year old son. 
In that case the balance that an advocate must achieve in respect of the veracity of 
their client's assertions was stated by Sir John Donaldson MR: 57 
56 [1987] QB 565 (CA). 
57 Orchard v South Eastern Electricity Board above n 56, 572.
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[I]t must never be forgotten that it is not for solicitors or counsel to impose a pre­trial screen 
through which a litigant must pass before he can put his complaint or defence before the court. 
On the other hand no solicitor or counsel should lend his assistance to a litigant if he is satisfied 
that the initiation or further prosecution of a claim is mala fide or for an ulterior purpose or, to 
put it more broadly, if the proceedings would be, or have become, an abuse of the process of 
the court or unjustifiably oppressive. 
In approaching the issue of whether the advocate has acted wrongly the court also 
emphasised the importance of not imposing the wisdom of hindsight on a decision made 
with limited information. In Orchard the Court of Appeal adopted the reasoning of Steyn 
J in the court below which noted that the solicitors and counsel for the plaintiff brought 
the action on the basis of independent observations of the phenomena and an expert 
report which supported the claim. The fact that at trial a key witness was rejected as 
wholly unreliable did not impugn the conduct of solicitors or counsel in presenting the 
case based on that evidence to the court. 
In contrast to Orchard is Tolstoy­Miloslavsky v Aldington. 58 In that case the plaintiff had 
formerly been successfully sued by the defendant for libel and a significant order for 
damages and costs had been made against him. In this action (which was brought some 
four years after the initial case) the plaintiff sought to have the earlier judgment set aside 
on the ground of fraud. It was held by the court that none of the evidence presented to 
the court was capable of establishing the fraud relied on, and that the action was brought 
solely to impugn the findings in the earlier case. It was found that the proceeding was 
"utterly hopeless" and an abuse of the process of the court. 59 Moreover it was observed 
that solicitors were not entitled to rely uncritically on the advice of counsel that a claim 
was sustainable but had to exercise their own judgment in accepting such advice. 60 The 
court found that the bringing of the action was wholly unjustified and that the assistance 
of the legal advisers showed a lack of due propriety which warranted an order of costs 
against them. 
The distinction between Orchard and Tolstoy appears to be the fact that in the former, 
had the court believed the plaintiffs' witnesses, it was possible that they might find in 
favour of the plaintiffs. Moreover, the court will not question an advocate's decision to 
rely on the evidence of an expert. By contrast in Tolstoy the evidence adduced by which 
the plaintiff sought to impugn the findings of the earlier court were incapable of 
establishing the case pleaded and consequently on the information available to the 
58 [1996] 1 WLR 736 (CA). 
59 Tolstoy­Miloslavsky v Aldington above n 58, 747. 
60 Tolstoy­Miloslavsky v Aldington above n 58, 747.
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advocate it could be demonstrated that the case was hopeless. Moreover in matters of law 
and legal practice a legal representative may not, by relying on the advice of another, 
divest themselves of their responsibility to conduct litigation responsibly. There were also 
aggravating factors in Tolstoy. The court was firm in its view that the action was brought 
to attack a previous final decision of the court and was therefore an abuse. Orchard is 
distinguishable because there the claim, though "weird" (in the words of the court), was 
brought in good faith. 
Where a client has made allegations which are unfounded, the court will be slow to 
punish an advocate for taking the client at their word. While an advocate should not 
bring a case if they are certain that it is ill founded, they are entitled to make their own 
judgment as to their client's veracity. If the advocate in question suffers a failure of 
judgment this does not amount to improper conduct or incompetence and therefore 
intervention by the court is inappropriate. In Y v M 61 a practitioner filed an affidavit in 
the Family Court which contained allegations of sexual abuse by a father of a child which 
transpired to be quite unfounded. While the court took the view that the filing of the 
affidavit was inappropriate, it was held that it was due to a lack of the proper degree of 
caution, unquestioning acceptance of the word of the mother, and the advocate's lack of a 
degree of scepticism of her client's version of events. In Y v M there was a degree of 
urgency to the case which meant that a full investigation was not possible. It was held 
that this was more an error of judgment than incompetence or misconduct and costs 
would not be awarded against the advocate. 62 
B Hopeless Law 
Lawyers (and particularly academics) spend most of their time dwelling on areas of 
the law which are doubtful or vague. However, many areas of the law, and particularly 
statute law, are exceedingly clear. Cases where the courts have imposed sanctions against 
advocates for legally hopeless claims generally involve the application of statute law. Not 
only is there less latitude for interpretation in respect of legislation, but also in the case of 
statutes, the courts have no power to amend or overrule. 63 
61 Above n 22. The duty not to admit evidence of serious allegations unless the advocate is satisfied 
that the making of such an allegation is justified on the facts of the case is also found in r 8.05 of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct of Barristers and Solicitors. See also Gazley v Wellington District Law 
Society [1996] 1 NZLR 452, 454 (High Court sitting with a full panel of three judges). 
62 Following R & T Thew Ltd v Reeves (No 2) [1982] QB 1283, 1286 (CA). 
63 This of course varies between jurisdictions.  However the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy by 
which the courts are unable to amend or overrule legislation passed by Parliament is in full force 
in both New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
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In Da Sousa v Minister of Immigration 64 it was found that an application for entry 
permits, and the application for review subsequent on the refusal of entry, was doomed 
to fail. Moreover, "to a legal practitioner familiar with the provisions of the Act and 
Regulations there should have been no doubt that ... Mrs Da Sousa did not qualify for the 
grant of such permits". 65 In Da Sousa French J followed the English authorities, including 
Orchard, in noting that it was not the fact that the claim failed which led to an order of 
costs being made against the advocate, but the fact that the bringing of the action 
amounted to a serious dereliction of duty. The application amounted to such a dereliction 
because it reflected "a serious failure to give reasonable attention to the relevant law and 
the facts". 66 
Da Sousa was relied on in New Zealand by Giles J in McDonald v FAI (NZ) General 
Insurance Company Ltd. 67 The facts giving rise to that case are complex. The plaintiff was a 
victim of the fraud of a former solicitor who had since been bankrupted. Compensation 
for losses suffered at the hands of the former solicitor was sought from the solicitor's 
insurer, and the Law Society. The claim for costs against the advocate was made in 
respect of the claim against the insurer 68 which failed on a number of counts. 69 In light of 
these failures the court found that "there really never was any prospect whatever of 
64 (1993) 114 ALR 708 (FCA). 
65 Da Sousa v Minister of Immigration above n 64, 710. 
66 Da Sousa v Minister of Immigration above n 64, 713. 
67 McDonald v FAI above n 9. 
68 Although there was considerable concern by the court of the conduct of the claim against the Law 
Society including the refusal of a settlement offer paid into court, without clear instruction from 
the client, of a sum which far exceeded the final award. 
69 The central argument of the plaintiff was that s 9 of the Law Reform Act 1936 (which provides that 
if a contract of insurance indemnifies the insured against damages the party in whose favour the 
damages have been awarded has a charge over any insurance money payable which is recoverable 
by that party by a court action against the insurer). That argument failed because it: 
· ignored the fact that the contract of insurance did not cover the loss claimed 
because the amount claim was due under a guarantee and this was not a risk 
covered by the contract of insurance; and 
· relied on the existence of a second policy of insurance to an innocent member of the 
firm, however, no such policy existed; and lastly 
· all insurance was obviously voidable for material non disclosure as all the insured 
parties had failed to disclose knowledge of the frauds which had occurred.
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success against FAI". 70 In reviewing the authorities Giles J rejected counsel's contention 
that the court's jurisdiction to award costs against legal advisers is restricted to solicitors. 
In looking to the recent English authorities his Honour noted that they were applying 
the statutory wasted costs regime. However, the tests applied were held to be relevant. 
This meant that the older test of "serious dereliction" found in Myers v Elman 71 was 
abandoned in favour of a lower test which is best expressed in the Giles J's own words: 72 
The wasted costs jurisdiction does not require serious professional misconduct. Mistake or 
error of judgment will not justify an order, but misconduct, default or even negligence is 
enough if that negligence is serious or gross. Neither will the fact that the case was lost be 
enough. All the circumstances have to be looked at. The jurisdiction is compensatory not 
punitive, but if the facts cry out for a remedy (as they do here) then the jurisdiction exists. 
In McDonald v FAI the advocate was pressing the hopeless case without the fully 
informed consent of the client. Giles J stated that if the client is informed of the 
hopelessness of the case and instructs the legal adviser(s) to continue then no misconduct 
is involved. This stance was taken relying on the reasoning of Sir Thomas Bingham MR in 
Ridehalgh v Horsefield 73 which was in turn based on the words of Lord Pearce in Rondel v 
Worsley 74 which concerned a quite different issue. 75 With respect, this seems to be at odds 
with the principle underlying the court's jurisdiction to award costs. If a case can be 
shown to be hopeless the advocate is not assisting a client in bringing a case for 
vindication of a legal right by a court order in their favour (or rejecting a claim based on a 
legitimate defence). The motivation for such a claim or defence must be collateral to the 
proceeding itself. Bringing a case for such a purpose amounts to an abuse to which an 
officer of the court must never be a party. 
This approach is reflected in the older case of Edwards v Edwards 76 which was cited by 
Giles J in FAI. There, facts were available to the wife who was the plaintiff in a 
matrimonial action for wilful neglect which showed that the case was doomed to fail. 
This information was available to her legal advisers only after discovery by the husband. 
70 McDonald v FAI above n 9, 587. 
71 Above n 32, and applied in numerous subsequent cases, see Abraham v Jutsun [1963] 1 WLR 658 
(CA). 
72 McDonald v FAI above n 9, 592. 
73 Above n 6, 234. 
74 Above n 12 and text accompanying. 
75 Followed in S v M (1998) TLR 201 (HC). 
76 [1958] P 235.
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Before that information was in the hands of the legal advisers their actions were 
unimpeachable.  However, it was held that to continue the action on the instructions of 
the wife in the face of this evidence amounted to a failure for which the costs could be 
awarded against the legal advisers. The fact that the client is aware of the hopelessness 
and consents to the continuation of the action cannot release the advocate of their duty to 
the court not to assist in abusing its process for a collateral purpose. 77 
C Novel Arguments 
There is a distinction between a case which is wholly without legal merit, and a case 
for which no precedent exists, or for which a contrary precedent exists. There are 
numerous examples of cases in which an advocate has successfully argued that the court 
ought to depart from existing law, or create a new rule. The mounting of a novel legal 
argument is not of itself misconduct, even if the judge who hears it refuses to extend the 
law in the way suggested. Indeed in Abraham v Jutsun Lord Denning MR noted that it is 
an advocate's "duty to take any point which he believed to be fairly arguable on behalf of 
his client. The advocate is not to usurp the province of the judge". 78 There are, however, 
two kinds of situation where an argument that is not consistent with existing law may 
amount to misconduct: if the advocate misleads the court as to the law, or if the argument 
is so without foundation as to show bad faith or incompetence on the part of the 
advocate. 79 
The statement of Lord Denning MR in Abraham v Jutsun was mitigated with the caveat 
that it is improper for an advocate to present the law to the court as something it is not. 
Thus when making an argument against authority, the existence of the contrary authority 
must be brought to the attention of the court. Harman LJ took a similar stance noting that 
it cannot be misconduct merely to take a bad legal point unless the advocate knows that 
the argument is flawed and conceals the flaw from the court. 80 It has similarly been held 
to be improper conduct to ignore contrary precedent and to cite misleadingly from 
cases. 81 
77 See also Tolstoy­Miloslavsky v Aldington, above n 58 where the plaintiff was clearly aware of the 
lack of merit of the claim and the motivation behind the action.  However the legal advisers were 
held liable for assisting in an action which amounted to an abuse of the process of the court. 
78 Abraham v Jutsun, above n 71, 663, followed in Utah Construction and Mining Co v Watson above n 
22, 1065. 
79 As to the duty to put all relevant authorities before the court see rule 8.01 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Barristers and Solicitors including cls 4 and 5 of the commentary. 
80 Abraham v Jutsun, above n 71, 663. 
81 A­Abart Electric Supply, Inc v Emerson Electric Co (1992) 956 F2d 1399 7 Cir (decided under r 11 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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Any novel argument mounted must have a degree of merit to it. It must be 
conceivable that a court would agree with the submission. It must therefore be within the 
jurisdiction of the court to make the order sought. Moreover it must be possible for the 
argument made to lead to the order sought. If the application is wholly misconceived, 82 
or simply fallacious 83 it demonstrates a degree of incompetence on behalf of the advocate 
which warrants the court ordering costs against them. Similarly if the arguments which 
are put forward also serve a collateral purpose such as the delaying of the inevitable 
exercise of remedies the court will give a short shrift to the advocate who makes them. 84 
Some assistance may be gained from rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 85 
Part of that rule provides that in representing a matter before the court the attorney 
warrants that: 
the claims, defences, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a 
non­frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the 
establishment of new law;... 
The test of non­frivolousness is an objective one which does not rely on the good faith 
of the advocate. 86 The notes of the advisory committee to the rules suggest that any legal 
argument must be based on a "plausible" view of the law. 87 If an argument has no basis 
in existing law and no realistic argument can be made that the law should be changed, 
sanctions will be imposed. 88 If the advocate can show that reasonable research was done 
into the point of law that is being argued this will assist in showing that the argument is 
non­frivolous. The mere fact that after research a mistake as to the law is made that 
would have been revealed with extended research will not, of itself, be enough for an 
order to be made. 
In McDonald v FAI, 89 while it was accepted that there will be cases where the 
boundaries of the law must be tested, and that litigants will often pursue tenuous claims 
82 As in Da Sousa v Minister of Immigration, above n 64. 
83 As in McDonald v FAI, above n 9. 
84 Henrickson v Grierson Jackson Securities Pukekohe Ltd above n 42. 
85 See above n 27 and 28. 
86 For a useful discussion of this aspect of the rule see Nancy Burger­Smith "Avoiding Sanctions 
Under Federal Rule 11: A Lawyers Guide to the 'New' Rule" (1989) 15 William Mitchell L Rev 607. 
87 See also Hurd v Ralphs Grocery Co (1987) 824 F2d 806 9 Cir. 
88 Gutterman v Eimicke (1989) 125 FRD 348 2 Cir (EDNY) 
89 Above n 9.
HOPELESS CASES 317 
which are abandoned before trial, the arguments were barred by the clear words of the 
statute and unequivocal law. 
In Ridehalgh v Horsefield 90 the solicitor­advocate erred in a fundamental aspect of the 
case.  However the error was not considered serious enough to invoke the wasted costs 
jurisdiction of the court because the law involved was complex, the authoritative works 
in the area gave no clear answer to the issue, the matter was a minor one and they were 
not specialists in the area, a judge in a lower court made the same mistake, counsel for 
the opposing party acceded to a consent order based on the mistaken point of law, and 
the final judgment on the point was reached only after two days argument and a reserved 
judgment. Thus even though the point taken was clearly and demonstrably wrong after 
thorough investigation, the level of complexity involved showed that the argument was 
not frivolous, and that a competent solicitor could reasonably make such an argument. 
D Impecunious Clients 
There are numerous instances where a successful litigant will be justifiably aggrieved 
that an action was brought against them and they are denied recompense due to the 
impecuniosity of the unsuccessful party. The courts have, however, been wary of placing 
responsibility at the door of legal advisers in all cases. However, the fact that a litigant is 
impecunious, even if the case is a doubtful one, is not to be held against the legal adviser. 
Such a stance would reduce the availability of legal assistance to those without funds 
even further as there would be additional risk imposed on any legal adviser that chose to 
act. This was pointed out by Barker J in Poa v Cornwell 91 where it was noted that the 
appropriate cause of action for a defendant in such a case was to seek security for costs 
prior to trial. Where an indigent party complains of a wrong, the court should be careful 
to ensure that the lack of funds does not impede the ability to seek redress from the 
courts. 
Similarly irrelevant to the question of costs being awarded against an advocate is 
whether the litigant is in receipt of legal aid. While the ability to recover costs against a 
legally aided litigant who is unsuccessful is severely limited, 92 the bringing of a legally 
aided claim that fails suggests, of itself, no misconduct by an advocate. Even a failure by 
an advocate to comply with the requirement to inform the other side that their client is 
90 Above n 6, 244. For a US equivalent where the research was inadequate see Crookham v Crookham 
(1990) 914 Fd 1027 7 Cir. 
91 (1995) 8 PRNZ 588 (HC). 
92 Legal Services Act 1991, ss 86 and 87.
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legally aided has been held not to warrant an order of costs. 93 Such an omission cannot 
be said to have caused the other party any loss, and in any event it is an oversight of too 
minor a nature to warrant sanction. The relationship between legal adviser and a legally 
aided client should be the same in all respects other than liability for costs. As Sir Thomas 
Bingham MR observed in Ridehalgh v Horsefield 94 the legal representatives of a legally 
aided client: 
...must bear prominently in mind that their conduct should not be tempered by the knowledge 
that their client is not their paymaster, and so not, in all probability, liable for the costs of the 
other side. 
Perhaps more problematic is the situation where a legal adviser acts without fee in a 
hopeless case. In general pro bono work is to be commended.  However where the pro 
bono work amounts to assisting in an abuse of the process of the court this seems to 
compound the misconduct. This problem had to be addressed by the court in Tolstoy­ 
Miloslavsky v Aldington 95 where the legal advisers acted without fee. The court, however, 
separated the fact that the case had been taken without fee, and the fact that it was 
hopeless and an abuse. It was held that as a matter of policy the court should encourage 
pro bono work, and as such it was not a relevant consideration in considering the 
conduct of the legal advisers. In particular a legal adviser who acts without fee should 
not be treated as a maintainer of an action and liable for costs on that basis. 96 
E Client Failure 
There are occasions where one party to an action is put to considerable expense by the 
manner in which the case is conducted. However, this is not always able to be laid at the 
door of the legal adviser. In one of the six cases which were consolidated in Ridehalgh v 
Horsefield, Antonelli v Wade Gery Farr, 97 a barrister accepted instructions six days before 
trial. The brief itself was not delivered at all, and only meagre papers were ever in the 
hands of the barrister. This was due to the failure of the client to attend to pre­trial 
matters. The trial judge had held that it was improper to accept a brief at such short 
notice and this had caused wasted costs. On appeal this finding was overturned. It was 
noted that the barrister was obliged by the rules of conduct to accept any instructions that 
93 Maroux v Soc Com Abel Pereria Da Fonesca SARL above n 47, also Roberts v Coverite (Asphalters)  Ltd 
reported in Ridehalgh v Horsefield above n 6, 247. 
94 Above n 6, 235. 
95 Above n 58. 
96 Above n 58, 746. 
97 Above n 6, 264.
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were within her area of expertise and which she was available for. Her action in taking 
the case at such short notice could not therefore be said to amount to misconduct. 
Moreover there will be instances where for one reason or another a client finds 
themselves without a legal representative at the last moment. The court should not make 
it more difficult for such litigants to gain assistance in such cases. 
Similarly where delays or omissions are due to client rather than lawyer default there 
can be no suggestion of misconduct by the lawyer. Thus if a client fails to respond to an 
offer, or give instruction to their legal representative, no order of costs ought to be made 
against the legal representative due to the consequent delays or costs. 98 In such cases any 
extra costs incurred are due to the inaction of the client rather than any action of the 
advocate. While costs may have been wasted, these ought properly to be laid at the door 
of the client rather than their legal adviser. 
F No Duty to the Other Side 
The sanction imposed where an advocate misconducts themselves in the course of 
litigation is invariably an order that they pay the costs of the opposing litigant. The fact 
that the order serves to compensate the other litigant for the expense to which they have 
been put by the advocate's misconduct appears to suggests that an advocate has a kind of 
duty to the other side in the conduct of litigation. Such a view gains support from the 
words of Lord Denning MR in Kelly v London Transport Executive 99 where he suggested 
that, at least when an advocate acts for a legally aided client, there is a duty to the other 
side not to put them to needless trouble or expense. This was based on dicta in the old 
case of Re Jones in which Lord Hatherly LC stated that: 100 
However anxious a solicitor may be in the execution of his duty, I think it the duty of the court 
to be equally anxious to see that solicitors not only perform their duty towards their clients, but 
also towards all those against whom they are concerned, and that care should be taken to see 
that the litigation is the bona fide litigation of the client and not a litigation carried on 
altogether on the solicitor's account. 
This is, however, weak authority for the claim made by Lord Denning MR, as it was 
made in the context of a suit which the solicitor in question was, in effect, wrongfully 
maintaining. It is a well recognised principle that a maintainer commits a tort against the 
98 Philex PLC v Globan (Trading as Capital Estates), cited in Ridehalgh v Horsefield above n 6, 250. 
99 [1982] 1 WLR 1055, 1064 (CA). 
100 Above n 35, 499. Lord Denning MR also relied on a statement of Viscount Maugham in Myers v 
Elman, above n 32, 290. However, that statement merely states the fact that a solicitor ought not to 
put the other party to needless expense through serious negligence.
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other party to litigation if the action is unsuccessful. The duty not to maintain is one 
owed as an ordinary citizen, not merely as a solicitor. 
There is a serious difficulty with any suggested duty owed by an advocate to the 
opposing litigant and its existence has been effectively rejected by the courts. It is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the adversarial process upon which the judicial system 
is based. The remarks of Lord Denning MR in Kelly were heavily criticised on this basis in 
Orchard v South Eastern Electricity Board 101 where the duty was formulated firmly as owed 
to the court. 
In New Zealand the courts have been careful to make the distinction between the 
application of their inherent jurisdiction to discipline those who appear before them for 
breaches of the duty to the court, and claims made by litigants against opposing 
advocates. The fact that the authorities dealing with the inherent jurisdiction of the court 
do not give rise to a cause of action against advocates was clearly stated by the Court of 
Appeal in Gordon v Treadwell Stacey Smith. 102 The Court there relied on the earlier 
authority of New Zealand Social Credit Political League v O'Brien 103 where Cooke J struck 
out an action against a solicitor for bringing an ill conceived action. It was there stated 
that unless the legal representative acted with malice, as well as without cause, no action 
could lie. 
VIII JUSTIFYING THE SUMMARY PROCEDURE 
If an application for costs against an advocate is successful it is possible that the court 
will make an award against the advocate that may impose considerable financial 
hardship. In such circumstances an advocate may understandably wish to be fully heard 
on the matter to the extent of discovering documents, calling evidence, and presenting 
arguments in the manner of a normal trial. Such an opportunity will, however, not be 
given. When an application for costs against an advocate is made, although the advocate 
will be given an opportunity to be heard in the matter, the conduct of the hearing into 
costs itself will be summary. It is not regarded as a matter where interlocutories such as 
discovery or interrogatories would generally be appropriate. 104 Provided the procedure is 
101 Above n 56, 106­107. 
102 [1996] 3 NZLR 281, 293 (CA). 
103 Above n 19, 88. 
104 A similar summary jurisdiction over the conduct of legal practitioners is to be found in the power 
of the court to enforce practitioners' undertakings. See Geoffrey Silver and Drake v Baines [1971] 1 QB 
396, 402 per Lord Denning MR (CA), National Westminster Finance NZ Ltd v Bryant [1989] 1 NZLR 
513 (HC).
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fair, the advocate is clearly informed of the nature of the misconduct alleged, and an 
opportunity to answer is given, justice will be served. 105 
A full and independent hearing of an application against an advocate is inappropriate 
for a number of reasons. It would be counter to the very spirit of the rule if, though 
designed to avoid multiplying litigation, it had the reverse effect. Indeed if the likely 
length and expense of such a costs hearing is disproportionate to the likely award, this 
will be a reason for refusing to entertain such an application. 106 Moreover it needs to be 
remembered that the proceeding is a disciplinary charge against the advocate by the court 
as well as a claim for compensation by the successful litigant (although both purposes are 
served). Thus an independent action in which the litigant is a formal party akin to one for 
maintenance or champerty is inappropriate. The foundation of the proceeding is the 
court's exercise of its inherent supervisory jurisdiction over its officers, not the 
vindication of legal rights of a successful litigant who has been put to unnecessary 
expense. 
Such orders are an exercise of the court's inherent supervisory jurisdiction. 107 Because 
of this a full hearing would be inappropriate. This is demonstrated by the fact that an 
order that an advocate pay the costs of a litigant may be made at the court's own instance. 
There has been a suggestion that the court should not be too ready to initiate such an 
application. 108 The reasoning behind such a reluctance is that the court should be careful 
about creating further litigation, and that if the application is ultimately declined the costs 
of the application will have to be borne by a party or parties that did not make the 
application. Whatever the origin of the application, the advocate whose conduct is under 
examination will be given fair warning of the possibility of the order, and an opportunity 
to defend themselves within the constraints of the summary procedure. 109 In the absence 
of a fair hearing any such order will be considered per incuriam. 110 
The courts must also be aware that the advocate may labour under significant 
difficulties in defending their conduct before the court. Thus in Tolstoy­Miloslavsky v 
Aldington 111 the court was careful when making an order against the legal advisers of the 
105 Ridehalgh v Horsefield above n 6, 238. 
106 In Re Freudiana Holdings Ltd [1995] TLR 635 (CA). 
107 The exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction will always be summary in nature and not a 
separate proceeding. See J Jacob "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court" above n 19. 
108 Ridehalgh v Horsefield above n 6, 238. 
109 Utah Construction and Mining Co v Watson above n 22, Abraham v Jutsun above n 71. 
110 Stephens v Stephens [1991] 1 NZLR 633 (HC). 
111 Above n 58, 746.
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plaintiff to point out that they had taken into account the fact that they could not disclose 
privileged documents or confidential information in mounting their own defence. The 
court must always be aware that the advocate may be unable to "tell the whole story" and 
in cases of doubt they are entitled to the benefit of that doubt. 112 
Injustice to an advocate resulting from the summary nature of the proceeding is 
unlikely. The threshold of hopelessness is so high that (as the cases show) there will in 
fact be few cases which are found hopeless in the manner described above, and in cases 
of doubt, or lack of evidence, the court will err in the advocate's favour. The procedure is 
necessary to achieve a balance between giving the advocate a fair opportunity to be 
heard, and ensuring that the further proceedings to which the successful litigant is 
subjected are kept to a minimum. 
If an application that an advocate pay the costs of a litigant is to be made, it should 
only be made once the substantive proceedings have been disposed of. This is to avoid 
the use of such applications, or threats of such applications, being used as a tactic prior to 
trial to stifle argument, intimidate counsel, or create a conflict between client and adviser 
which disqualifies the adviser. 113 
IX CONCLUSION 
There are numerous reasons why a litigant may want to bring a claim or mount a 
defence that has no prospect of success.  There are similarly a number of reasons why an 
advocate may wish to, or be under pressure to, assist in such an endeavour. If we accept 
that an advocate is more than a mere agent for the client, and has an independent role to 
play in the administration of justice, then assisting in a case which can be shown to be 
hopeless must amount to misconduct. It is this premise upon which the courts have 
exercised their jurisdiction to award costs against advocates who bring doomed claims or 
defences before the court. 
The courts have sought to achieve a balance between protecting those who appear 
before it, and ensuring that innocent victims of wrongdoing by an advocate are 
compensated. The rule that an advocate may not assist in bringing a hopeless case, or 
mounting a hopeless defence is, in fact, not as onerous as some might claim. The courts 
have only stepped in where a claim or defence was hopeless, and this would be apparent 
to any competent advocate who took the time to inquire. In cases of doubt the courts 
have rightly leaned in favour of the advocate. The court's jurisdiction to award costs 
against an advocate who assists in bringing a hopeless case is not a panacea for the 
112 See also Ridehalgh v Horsefield above n 6, 236. 
113 Orchard v South Eastern Electricity Board above n 56, 577 per Sir John Donaldson MR, 580 per Dillon 
LJ; also Ridehalgh v Horsefield above n 6, 237.
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proliferation of needless and doubtful litigation.  However, it does set a threshold of what 
the court will tolerate of which all advocates would do well to be aware.
